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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, we examined how income shifting performs among affiliates in a business group to 
maximize the benefits of the entire business group in terms of minimizing the tax burden, with a 
particular focus on the direction of income shifting between affiliates within the business group. 
We find that tax-related decision-making for the entire business group is affected by the 
relationships between the affiliated firms, that is, the ownership structure of the whole business 
group. To analyze the ownership structure, we use centrality measures in a social network 
analysis. The results show that affiliates with the higher outdegree-centrality; that is, firms 
investing more shareholdings in other affiliates have a tendency to perform more income shifting. 
On the other hand, the affiliates with high indegree-centrality, that is, firms which are owned by 
other affiliates, were revealed to be given the income shifting from other affiliated firms to 
minimize the tax burden of the entire business group. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ncome shifting through internal transactions between affiliated firms in Korean business groups
1 
are 
conducted for various reasons. The first incentive is to maximize the private profit of the controlling 
shareholders. In the case of business groups in South Korea, it is possible to control the entire business 
group with minimal capital because the controlling shareholders and their relatives (the controlling family, 
hereinafter referred to as the “controlling shareholders") control the cashflow rights through pyramidal 
shareholdings or cross-shareholdings between affiliated firms within the business group. Therefore, the controlling 
shareholders have considerable incentive to maximize profits for the benefit of the entire business group, rather than 
seeing the company as an individual enterprise for their own private benefit. This attitude can reduce the benefits to 
minority shareholders of an individual enterprise. In many instances, controlling shareholders make affiliated firms 
with their larger shares purchase the goods and services at a lower price from the affiliated firms with fewer shares 
or sell them at a higher price to the affiliated firms with smaller shares using their control. Controlling shareholders 
can also conduct the internal transactions between those affiliated firms, such as borrowing at lower interest rates 
than those available in the market or providing loans at higher interest rates. Through these internal transactions, 
distribution of wealth may occur. This behavior, which infringes on the interests of minority shareholders, has been 
called “tunneling” (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). 
 
Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) and Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) identified the phenomenon 
known as “propping,” in which controlling shareholders sacrifice their own interests to support floundering affiliated 
firms. Propping, which is the opposite of tunneling, enables good management of the entire group. It entails support 
from controlling shareholders to affiliated firms in the form of private resources. Unlike tunneling, the resource 
input by controlling shareholders may be of interest to minority shareholders. In addition, aid may also be given 
                                                          
1 Refer to Appendix 1. 
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between affiliated firms, separate from the private interests of controlling shareholders. Internal transactions within 
the same business group can assist ailing firms greatly, which helps the entire group. 
 
Because internal markets can be more efficient than external markets, internal transactions between 
affiliated firms are often conducted to improve the efficiency of the entire business group. Because internal 
financing is more advantageous to purchasing costs than external financing, recipient firms can use the resulting 
funds to invest or expand a new business. 
 
Income shifting through internal transactions can also relieve the tax burden and maximize the interests of 
the business group. Jung, Kim, and Kim (2009) revealed that in some business groups, gains are transferred to 
affiliated firms with smaller tax burdens to minimize the tax burden of the entire group. Once the cash reserve drain 
of the entire business group has been minimized due to alleviation of the tax burden, efficiency will increase. In 
addition, income shifting increases as the equity rates of controlling shareholders increase (i.e., tunneling behavior). 
In this scenario, controlling shareholders shift their income to maximize their own interests (Jung, Kim, & Kim, 
2009). Income shifting is conducted from affiliated firms with a large tax burden to those with a small tax burden. 
Here, firms with a small tax burden are those with low accounting income. If income shifting happens from 
affiliated firms with higher income to those with lower income, propping has occurred. To summarize, internal 
transactions for minimizing the tax burden are important within business groups, and can occur for tunneling, 
propping, and group efficiency reasons. 
 
In this study, we examine the features of affiliated companies within Korean business groups, especially 
those involved in income shifting through internal transactions and the directions of these internal transactions for 
the purpose of minimizing the tax burden. We expect that the relationships between affiliated firms are important. 
Decision-making for the benefit of the entire business group is affected by the relationships between affiliated firms, 
that is, the ownership structure between the affiliated firms. To analyze this ownership structure, we use centrality 
measures in a social network analysis. This method has been utilized in research in the field of sociology. Centrality, 
that is, the degree to which a firm is located in the center of the network of a business group, indicates the extent to 
which an affiliated firm is connected to other affiliates. In other words, a company with high centrality means that it 
owns many shares of other affiliated firms within the identical business group. Two methods are used to measure 
centrality: One is outdegree centrality which indicates the extent of investment in other affiliated firms, and the other 
is indegree centrality which indicates the degree of shareholdings which are owned by other affiliated firms. 
 
Collins et al. (1998) and Gramlich et al. (2004) revealed that firms involved in income shifting reported 
lower pretax income compared to other firms in order to minimize the tax burden subject to the same marginal tax 
rate. In this study, we examine the direction of income shifting depending on ownership structure. We hypothesize 
that firms that initiate income shifting will have lower pretax income at a given marginal tax rate. In addition, firms 
that receive the income will have higher pretax income at the same marginal tax rate. 
 
The results of the analysis reveal that affiliates with the higher outdegree-centrality; that is, the firms 
investing more shareholdings in other affiliates have a tendency to perform more income shifting. By contrast, 
affiliates with high indegree centrality were revealed to be awarded the income from other affiliated firms in order to 
minimize the tax burden of the entire business group. Based on these results, two conclusions can be drawn. First, 
income shifting for minimizing tax burden of the business group is usually conducted in the center of the affiliates 
with high centrality. Secondly, income shifting often occurs from firms with high outdegree centrality to firms with 
high indegree-centrality. 
 
2. RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) found that the controlling shareholders behave 
the income shifting in a direction favorable to them but not to minority shareholders for their own private interest, 
which was defined as “tunneling.” Furthermore, they suggest the decision of the internal shifting price, private use 
of firm’s assets, and guarantees of debt that are favorable to controlling shareholders as types of tunneling. Bertrand 
et al. (2002) demonstrated that controlling shareholders pursue their own private interests as income is shifted from 
firms with low share ratios for controlling shareholders to firms with high share ratios. Income shifting for the 
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benefit of controlling shareholders is reported to have adverse effects on firm value. Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 
(2006) showed a negative effect of tunneling on the price–earnings ratio. In that study, a lower excess earnings ratio 
for internal transactions between affiliated firms was associated with a higher share ratio of controlling shareholders. 
The analysis revealed an effect of disclosing internal transactions on the stock price of listed firms in Hong Kong. 
Gordon, Henry, and Palia (2004) found no effect of internal transactions in efficient internal capital markets. In that 
study, the price–earnings ratio decreased in firms with more vulnerable corporate governance and more frequent 
internal transactions. They analyzed the relationship between controlling structures and firm value by examining 
internal transactions between firms and board members in American firms during the period from 2000 to 2001. 
 
However, Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) and Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) revealed that in some 
cases, the controlling shareholders sacrificed their own interests for ailing firms within their financial group, which 
is known as “propping.” They proposed that firms with high debt may require more propping by controlling 
shareholders than firms with less debt. 
 
Most studies of internal transactions to benefit the entire business group focused on minimization of the tax 
burden. Many studies have examined income shifting between firms with different tax rates or in different 
jurisdictions. For example, income is shifted between firms in multi-national corporations to reduce the combined 
tax burden by taking advantage of differences in tax rate between jurisdictions (Collins et al., 1998; Harris et al., 
1993; Jacob, 1996; Klassen et al., 1993; Mills & Newsberry, 2004). Jung, Kim, and Kim (2009) studied 
minimization of the tax burden via income shifting between firms subject to the same taxation authority. In that 
study, income was shifted from affiliates with large tax burdens to those with small tax burdens for the benefit of the 
entire group in Korean business group. Income shifting occurred more often as the share ratio of the controlling 
shareholders increased. Thus, this strategy is used to maximize benefit for the business group as a whole or for the 
benefit of the controlling shareholders. Such internal transactions between affiliated firms may involve goods, 
services, borrowing, and guarantees. 
 
Jung, Kim, and Kim (2009) revealed that in business groups with affiliates with large tax burdens, income 
was shifted to affiliates with lower tax burdens to alleviate the tax burden of the entire group. Firms with high share 
ratios of the single largest shareholder shifted income in order to maximize the benefits to the controlling 
shareholders and the group as a whole. However, features of individual firms only such as the size of the tax burden 
and largest shareholder equity ratio were examined in this study. However, the relationships between affiliates can 
also influence such internal transactions within a business group. As decisions about internal transactions affect the 
entire business group, the relationships between affiliates are important, especially in business groups with 
complicated ownership structures, such as pyramidal structures and cross-shareholdings. The relationships between 
affiliates are formed through the purchase of shares. 
 
In the business group, some firms have many relationships with other affiliates, while others do not. The 
degree to which individual firms’ actions participating in maximizing the benefits of the entire business group may 
vary according to the intensity of their relationships with other affiliates. For firms with more relationships with 
other affiliated firms, internal transactions between affiliates can occur frequently. 
 
A negative change may occur for firms whose profit is reduced as a result of income shifting. However, 
investing firms may gain income from the firms in which they invest. In the case of applying the equity method, the 
equity method income can be recognized as much as the share ratios multiplying accounting income of the invested 
firms. Even if the equity method is not applied, they can earn economic income from the increase of stock values of 
the firms awarded shareholdings or dividend. Therefore, if the firm who owns many shareholdings of their affiliates 
performs the income shifting, it cannot be substantially harmful economically to the individual firms and it can 
contribute to the interest of the entire business group. Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Performing income shifting will be more prevalent in firms that own more shares in other 
affiliated firms within the business group. 
 
On the other hand, the firm who is awarded many shareholdings among the affiliates within the business 
group faces a different situation compared to the firm awarding many shareholdings. If firms that are more owned 
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by other affiliates receive income, positive economic changes such as increased accounting income or stock value 
would be more belonging to investing companies which are also affiliates. In other words, the effect of income 
shifting is maximized when shifted income is given to the firms that are more owned from other affiliates within the 
business because shifted income still exists within the group more. Therefore, we hypothesize this: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Receiving income shifting will be more prevalent in firms that are more owned from other 
affiliates within the business group. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The sample selection procedure is reported in Panel A of Table 1. The Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter 
referred to as the F. T. Commission) designates and presents a list of business groups yearly according to specific 
criteria.
2
 In the sample used in this study, firms not subject to external audit and those without financial data have 
been excluded from the list of firms affiliated with business groups announced by the F. T. Commission from 2001 
to 2010. Public enterprise conglomerates have been excluded, as their decision-making processes are different from 
those of other affiliates in the business group in terms of governance and ownership structure. After the exclusion of 
these firms, 3,788 firm-years were included in the final sample. The data on ownership structure of the firms 
included in the sample was extracted from the F. T. Commission report. The shareholding network structure of the 
group can be inferred by determining the ownership and shareholding structures of the entire group, because the data 
includes the ownership structure of all the affiliates belonging to the group, including all unlisted and listed firms. 
The financial data was collected from the KIS-VALUE database. Panel B of Table 1 shows the numbers of listed and 
unlisted firms in the designated sample. The number of listed firms (1,102 firm-years) accounted for 29% of the 
total sample. Panel C of Table 1 describes the industry classification of the firms in the sample. Firms in the 
financial business accounted for the largest part of the sample (n = 353, 9.3%), followed by the general construction 
business (n = 284, 7.5%), and businesses manufacturing compounds and chemical products (n = 245, 6.5%). For 
outliers, 1% winsorizing was conducted for the following variables: PTAXROA, ETR
3
1, ETR2, outdegree centrality, 
and leverage. 
 
Table 1: Sample Firms 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure 
Number of sample firms from among the firms affiliated to the business group: 9,570  
Less the firms with no financial data on the KIS-VALUE database: 5,411 
(corporations not subject to external audit and firms without financial data) 
Less public enterprises: 371  
Total sample: 3,788 firms 
Panel B: Distribution of Sample Firms by Year 
Year Listed Unlisted All 
2001 79 107 186 
2002 86 128 214 
2003 94 162 256 
2004 101 197 298 
2005 107 239 346 
2006 119 287 406 
2007 128 353 480 
2008 113 311 424 
2009 126 407 533 
2010 149 496 645 
Total 1102 (29%) 2686 (71%) 3788 (100%) 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Refer to Appendix 1. 
3 We use the abbreviation PTAXROA to indicate the pretax return on assets and ETR to indicate the effective tax rate. 
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Table 1 cont. 
Panel C: Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry 
Industry N % 
Food Products and Beverages 152 4.0% 
Textiles 23 0.6% 
Pulp, Paper, and Paper Products 10 0.3% 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 245 6.5% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 97 2.6% 
Basic Metals 159 4.2% 
Electronic Components, Radio, Television, and 
Communication Equipment and Apparatus 
144 3.8% 
Other Machinery and Equipment 183 4.8% 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers, and Semitrailers 153 4.0% 
Electricity, Gas, Steam, and Hot Water Supply 140 3.7% 
Construction 284 7.5% 
Wholesale 209 5.5% 
Retail Trader (Excluding Motor Vehicles) 192 5.1% 
Other Services 1,444 3.8% 
Finance 353 9.3% 
Total 3,788 100 
 
3.2 Empirical Model and Variables 
 
For verification of Hypothesis 1 (performing income shifting will be more prevalent in firms that own more 
shares in other affiliated firms within the business group) and Hypothesis 2 (receiving income shifting will be more 
prevalent in firms that are more owned from other affiliates within the business group), we examine the relationship 
between pretax income rates (which show profitability) and effective tax rates (which indicate the tax burden). In 
general, pretax income rates and effective tax rates are in a positive relationship (Rego, 1999). Internal transactions 
between affiliated firms such as sales and purchasing of goods, receipt and payment of commission fees for services, 
and interest income and expenses incurred through trading on equity, have an effect on the pretax income of firms 
that are shifting income and those receiving income. The degree of positivity of the relationship between effective 
and pretax tax rates is reflected in the relationship between these two types of firms. According to Collins et al. 
(1998) and Gramlich et al. (2004), firms performing income shifting reported lower pretax income rates at the same 
effective tax rates compared to firms that did not income shifting. Therefore, firms awarding income shifting will 
report lower pretax income rates than firms with the same effective tax rates that are not involved in income shifting. 
On the other hand, firms receiving income will report higher pretax income rates than firms not receiving income at 
the same effective tax rates. 
 
In this study, social network analysis is used to analyze ownership structure between affiliates within one 
business group. Previous studies, mainly in the field of sociology, have used social network analysis to measure the 
degree of crossover shareholding between affiliated firms. Recently, this method has been used as a tool to analyze 
business groups Choi (2009) analyzed the ownership structure of business groups using social network analysis. 
 
We measure centrality by describing the role of specific firms within a business group using social network 
analysis. Centrality is an index representing the proximity of a given performer to the center of the entire network, 
and its connection to other performers. Thus, centrality measures the number of direct connections. It has often been 
used as a measure of influence in sociology research. Centrality may occur in two directions. For outdegree 
centrality, the direction of exchange is outwards, and for indegree centrality, connections come in from outside. In 
this study, we define outdegree centrality as the number of shares held by other affiliates within the business group. 
Outdegree centrality is the sum of equity rates owned by individual firms in other affiliates (see Equation 1). 
Therefore, as outdegree centrality increases, firms have more shares of other affiliates within the business group. For 
instance, a holding company that awards shares to all its subsidiary companies has high outdegree centrality. 
 
                           (1) 
 
where interest is the sum of simple equity rates invested in each affiliate. 
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Indegree centrality reflects the shareholding relationship within the business group, which is the sum of 
equity rates that an individual firm is awarded from affiliated firms within the group. The calculation is shown in 
Equation 2: 
 
                          (2) 
 
where interest is the sum of simple equity rates being invested from each affiliate. 
 
Based on this concept, we develop the following study model to verify Hypothesis 1 (performing income 
shifting will be more prevalent in firms that own more shares in other affiliated firms within the business group) 
(Equation 3): 
 
                                                                
                                                         (3) 
 
where PTAXROA(pretax return on assets) is measured as the ratio of the pretax income to total underlying assets. 
 
We use the abbreviation ETR to indicate the effective tax rate as a proxy for tax burden, which means the 
corporate tax that the firms actually pay. In this study, the effective tax rate is measured in two ways. ETR1 is the 
amounts of tax payable
4
 that one corporation reports divided by pre-tax income. ETR2 is the amount of corporate 
tax expenses divided by pre-tax income, including deferred corporate taxes, influencing future corporate tax due to 
events occurring during the current term, as well as the corporate tax actually paid in the current year, compared to 
the pretax income. We additionally used the dummy variables ABOVEETR1 and ABOVEETR2 after dividing ETR1 
and ETR2 by the median; giving it a value of 1 if it is larger than the median, and otherwise giving it a value of 0. 
For OUTDEGREE, which shows the degree of shareholding among affiliates, two values are used: the actual values 
and a standardized value to control for differences in shareholding structure for each group. NRM_OUTDEGREE, 
as a value standardizing OUTDEGREE, is shown as Equation 4: 
 
              
                                    
                  
 (4) 
 
As Hypothesis 1 is that performing income shifting will be more prevalent in firms that own more shares in 
other affiliated firms within the business group, the interaction values (             ) of the tax burden proxy 
(ETR) and OUTDEGREE, which show the degree of shareholding to affiliated firms, are expected to have a 
negative relationship with the pretax income rates ( 2 < 0). That is, because income shifting performs more 
frequently in firms with a high outdegree, PTAXROA will be lower compared to ETR. In order to verify Hypothesis 
2 (receiving income shifting will be more prevalent in firms receiving investment and many shares from other 
affiliates within the business group) we present Equation 5: 
 
                                                                         
                                              (5) 
 
The tax burden proxy (ETR) is measured as in Equation 3, which was used to verify Hypothesis 1. 
INDEGREE, which shows the degree of investment from affiliated firms, uses two values as also used for 
OUTDEGREE: the actual values and a standardized value to control for the differences in the shareholding structure 
between groups. NRM_INDEGREE, a value standardizing INDEGREE, is shown in Equation 6: 
 
             
                                    
                  
 (6) 
 
As Hypothesis 2 is receiving income shifting will be more prevalent in firms receiving investment and 
many shares from other affiliates within the business group, the interaction values (ETR * indegree) of the tax 
                                                          
4 Firms with year-end in December must include the appropriate corporate tax amount that must be paid before the end of next March as income 
tax payable in a balance sheet of the end of the year. 
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burden proxy (ETR) and INDEGREE, which shows the degree of investment by affiliated firms, is expected to have 
a positive relationship ( 2 > 0). That is, because income shifting are received more frequently in firms with a high 
indegree, the pretax income rate is expected to increase compared to the ETR. 
 
The control variables in Equations 3 and 5 are as follows. According to Jung, Kim, and Kim (2009), in 
business groups, the ratio of shares belonging to controlling shareholders should be considered a control variable. In 
addition, a group dummy
5
 has been included in this study to control for differences between business groups since 
income shifting is often used to maximize income in the business group as a whole, alleviating tax burdens. Other 
control variables include company size (SIZE), which is a natural logarithm value of total underlying assets, 
LEVERAGE (debt divided by assets), an industry dummy, and a year dummy. A summary of all variables is 
provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Variables  
PTAXROA = Pre-tax income/total assets at the beginning of the year, 
ETR1 (effective tax rate 1) = current taxes payable / pre-tax income 
ABOVEETR1 = If ETR1 > median of ETR1, then ABOVEETR1 = 1; otherwise, 0 
ETR2 (effective tax rate 2) = tax expense /pre-tax income 
ABOVEETR2 = If ETR2 > median of ETR2, then ABOVEETR2 = 1; otherwise, 0 
OUTDEGREE = sum of simple equity rates invested in affiliates 
NRM_OUTDEGREE = standardized value of OUTDEGREE, 
                                    
                  
 
INDEGREE = sum of simple equity rates invested by affiliates 
NRM_INDEGREE = standardized value of INDEGREE,
                                    
                  
 
LARGEST = controlling shareholders’ ownership ratio 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of the total assets 
LEVERAGE = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis of Major Variables 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean and median of 
PTAXROA are, respectively, 0.0491 and 0.0440. The mean (median) of ETR1 and ETR2 indicating the corporate 
tax burden are respectively 0.1012(0.0587) and 0.1686(0.2294). As the mean of OUTDEGREE, which is the sum of 
equity rates invested in affiliated firms, is 78.7951, firms belonging to the business group possess the equity rates 
equivalent to 78.7951% of the affiliated firms on average. However, because the median of OUTDEGREE is 0, the 
standard deviation must be large because half the firms belonging to the business group do not own shares in other 
affiliates. Also, because INDEGREE, which is the sum of equity rates invested by affiliates, is 57.0247, 57.0247% 
of the stock of firms belonging to the business group must be owned by affiliated firms. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
PTAXROA 0.0491 0.1633 0.0017 0.0440 0.1125 
ETR1 0.1012 0.1563 0.0000 0.0587 0.1698 
ABOVEETR1  0.5000 0.5001 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
ETR2 0.1686 0.2461 0.0000 0.2294 0.2827 
ABOVEETR2 0.5000 0.5001 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
OUTDEGREE 78.7951 164.5714 0.0000 0.0000 80.3500 
NRM_OUTDEGREE 4.1181 10.8535 0.0000 0.0000 2.4630 
INDEGREE 57.0247 34.0798 30.0650 51.8600 96.1400 
NRM_INDEGREE 2.7378 5.5223 0.8390 1.6670 3.1050 
LARGEST 0.0504 0.1523 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 
SIZE 25.9572 2.0841 24.4081 25.7013 27.4488 
LEVERAGE 0.5509 0.2666 0.3651 0.5610 0.7209 
For the definition of variables, refer to Table 2. 
                                                          
5 The 65 largest conglomerates are included in the sample. 
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Table 4 shows that the positive correlations between PTAXROA and ETR1 and between PTAXROA and 
ETR2 both indicate that pretax income rates and tax burden are in a positive relationship. The positive correlation 
between ETR2 and OUTDEGREE indicates that firms that own many shares have a large tax burden, as ETR is high. 
The negative correlation between ETR2 and INDEGREE indicates that firms that are invested in many shares from 
other affiliates have a small tax burden. From the positive correlation between SIZE and OUTDEGREE and the 
negative correlation between SIZE and INDEGREE, we can infer that the affiliates investing many shares are large 
companies, and the affiliates being invested many shares from other affiliates are relatively small. 
 
Table 4: Correlations among Variables 
 ETR1 ETR2 OUTDEGREE INDEGREE Size 
PTAXROA 
0.1992 
(<0.0001) 
0.1799 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0138 
(0.3958) 
0.0070 
(0.6687) 
-0.0435 
(0.0075) 
ETR1  
0.2934 
(<0.0001) 
0.0130 
(0.4242) 
-0.0150 
(0.3548) 
0.0406 
(0.0125) 
ETR2   
0.0668 
(<.0001) 
-0.0796 
(<.0001) 
0.0644 
(<.0001) 
OUTDEGREE    
-0.4166 
(<.0001) 
0.4826 
(<.0001) 
INDEGREE     
-0.3958 
(<.0001) 
For the definition of variables, refer to Table 2. 
 
4.2 Results of Regression Analysis 
 
The results of the regression analysis for verification of Hypothesis 1 (performing income shifting will be 
more prevalent in firms that own more shares in other affiliated firms within the business group) are represented in 
Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis using OUTDEGREE (not standardized as the 
independent variable), ETR1 (Panel A), ETR2 (Panel C), ABOVEETR1 (Panel B), and ABOVEETR2 (Panel D). All 
coefficients of the effective tax rates in Panels A~D of Table 5 indicate positive values significant at the 1% level. 
These results support those of previous studies, which indicated that the tax burden increases as the pretax income 
rates increase. Also, the coefficients ( 2) of the interaction variables (ETR * OUTDEGREE) of the tax burden and 
the degree of shareholdings, which are the key variables for verification of Hypothesis 1, are negative and 
significant at the 5% level in Panels A~C and at the 1% level in Panel D of Table 5. Therefore, this result supports 
Hypothesis 1. Table 6 shows the results of the analysis using NRM_OUTDEGREE, which is OUTDEGREE 
standardized to consider differences in shareholding structure among groups. The results are similar to those with 
Table 5. Therefore, when the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 are combined, we see that performing income 
shifting occurs more frequently in firms that own more shares in affiliates within the business group. 
 
Table 5: Results of Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Panel A: Regression Results Using Effective Tax Rate 1 and Outdegree 
                                                                            
                                               
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.04825 0.04068 -1.19 -0.05090 0.04067 -1.25 
ETR1 0.17792 0.01580 11.26*** 0.19609 0.01776 11.04*** 
ETR1*OUTDEGREE    -0.00021 0.00009 -2.24** 
OUTDEGREE -0.00001 0.00002 -0.62 0.00001 0.00002 0.47 
LARGEST 0.07353 0.01972 3.73*** 0.07364 0.01971 3.74*** 
SIZE -0.00062 0.00156 -0.40 -0.00058 0.00156 -0.37 
LEVERAGE -0.11561 0.00974 -11.86*** -0.11549 0.00974 -11.86*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.37 
(<.0001) 
  
13.29 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2240   0.2295   
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Table 5 cont. 
Panel B: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate Dummy 1 and Outdegree 
                                                                           
                                                          
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.04491 0.03877 -1.16 -0.04636 0.03876 -1.2 
ABOVEETR1 0.10655 0.00486 21.93*** 0.11152 0.00533 20.94*** 
ABOVEETR1*OUTDEGREE    -0.00006 0.00003 -2.27** 
OUTDEGREE 0.00000 0.00002 -0.09 0.00003 0.00002 1.43 
LARGEST 0.06354 0.01890 3.36*** 0.06437 0.01890 3.41*** 
SIZE -0.00329 0.00149 -2.20** -0.00336 0.00149 -2.25** 
LEVERAGE -0.08496 0.00944 -9.00*** -0.08452 0.00944 -8.96*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
18.75 
(<.0001) 
  
18.61 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2933   0.2943   
Panel C: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 2 and Outdegree 
                2   2    2                                                    
    roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.03828 0.04061 -0.94 -0.04099 0.04059 -1.01 
ETR2 0.10570 0.01006 10.51*** 0.11972 0.01129 10.60*** 
ETR2*OUTDEGREE    -0.00018 0.00007 -2.72** 
OUTDEGREE -0.00002 0.00002 -1.08 0.00002 0.00002 0.75 
LARGEST 0.07366 0.01980 3.72*** 0.07262 0.01979 3.67*** 
SIZE -0.00125 0.00156 -0.80 -0.00133 0.00156 -0.86 
LEVERAGE -0.11102 0.00979 -11.35*** -0.10946 0.00979 -11.18*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.09 
(<.0001) 
  
13.05 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2247   0.2262   
Panel D: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate Dummy 2 and Outdegree 
                     2   2         2                                         
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.03467 0.04007 -0.87 -0.05360 0.04015 -1.33 
ABOVEETR2 0.07475 0.00509 14.68*** 0.08581 0.00559 15.34*** 
ABOVEETR2*OUTDEGREE    -0.00014 0.00003 -4.70*** 
OUTDEGREE -0.00001 0.00002 -0.32 0.00006 0.00002 2.57** 
LARGEST 0.06731 0.01954 3.44*** 0.06232 0.01952 3.19*** 
SIZE -0.00284 0.00155 -1.84* -0.00260 0.00154 -1.68* 
LEVERAGE -0.10659 0.00966 -11.04*** -0.10372 0.00965 -10.75*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
14.70 
(<.0001) 
  
14.87 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2455   0.2500   
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Table 6: Results of Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Panel A: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 1 and Nrm_Outdegree 
                   2       rm  utdegree     rm  utdegree                  
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.02530 0.03897 -0.65 -0.02703 0.03895 -0.69 
ETR1 0.17816 0.01566 11.38*** 0.19379 0.01695 11.43*** 
ETR1* 
              
   -0.00363 0.00152 -2.39** 
              0.00016 0.00028 0.55 0.00055 0.00033 1.68* 
LARGEST 0.07814 0.01988 3.93*** 0.08069 0.01989 4.06*** 
SIZE -0.00185 0.00147 -1.26 -0.00187 0.00147 -1.28 
LEVERAGE -0.11278 0.00966 -11.67*** -0.11180 0.00967 -11.57*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.37 
(<.0001) 
  
13.29 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2283   0.2295   
Panel B: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate dummy 1 and Nrm_Outdegree 
                        2            rm  utdegree     rm  utdegree           
                      roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.02997 0.03729 -0.8 -0.03206 0.03724 -0.86 
ABOVEETR1 0.10675 0.00486 21.99*** 0.11233 0.00514 21.85*** 
ABOVEETR1* 
              
   -0.00146 0.00045 -3.27*** 
              0.00028 0.00027 1.05 0.00105 0.00036 2.94** 
LARGEST 0.06588 0.01903 3.46*** 0.07241 0.01911 3.79*** 
SIZE -0.00401 0.00141 -2.85** -0.00410 0.00141 -2.91** 
LEVERAGE -0.08358 0.00937 -8.92*** -0.08224 0.00937 -8.78*** 
Group dummy Include   include   
Industry dummy Include   include   
Year dummy Include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
18.77 
(<.0001) 
  
18.72 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2935   0.2955   
Panel C: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 2 and               
                2  2    2   rm  utdegree     rm  utdegree                  
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.01530 0.03907 -0.39 -0.01552 0.03904 -0.4 
ETR2 0.10571 0.01006 10.51*** 0.11647 0.01096 10.63*** 
ETR2*                 -0.00277 0.00113 -2.46** 
              0.00009 0.00028 0.31 0.00067 0.00037 1.82* 
LARGEST 0.07414 0.01995 3.72*** 0.07428 0.01993 3.73*** 
SIZE -0.00234 0.00148 -1.59 -0.00248 0.00148 -1.68* 
LEVERAGE -0.10891 0.00972 -11.20*** -0.10738 0.00974 -11.03*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.08 
(<.0001) 
  
13.01 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2244   0.2257   
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Table 6 cont. 
Panel D: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate dummy 2 and Nrm_Outdegree 
                     2   2         2   rm  utdegree     rm  utdegree           
                      roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.01862 0.03853 -0.48 -0.02711 0.03855 -0.70 
ABOVEETR2 0.07499 0.00509 14.74*** 0.08159 0.00542 15.05 *** 
ABOVEETR2* 
NRM_OUTDEGREE 
   -0.00162 0.00047 -3.45*** 
NRM_OUTDEGREE 0.00022 0.00028 0.8 0.00113 0.00038 2.97** 
LARGEST 0.06906 0.01968 3.51*** 0.06578 0.01967 3.34*** 
SIZE -0.00362 0.00146 -2.48** -0.00366 0.00146 -2.51** 
LEVERAGE -0.10511 0.00959 -10.96*** -0.10228 0.00961 -10.64*** 
Group dummy include   include   
Industry dummy include   include   
Year dummy include   include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
14.71 
(<.0001) 
  
14.72 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2456   0.2480   
 
The results of the regression analysis that verified Hypothesis 2 (receiving income shifting will be more 
prevalent in firms receiving investment and many shares from other affiliates within the business group) are shown 
in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 shows the results of the regression analysis using INDEGREE (not standardized) as the 
independent variable and ETR1 (Panel A), ETR2 (Panel C), ABOVEETR1 (Panel B), and ABOVEETR2 (Panel D). 
All coefficients of the effective tax rates in Panels A~D of Table 7 indicate positive values significant at the 1% level. 
Here, the results support those of previous studies, which found a positive relationship between the pretax income 
and effective tax rates. The coefficients of the interaction variables (ETR * INDEGREE) of the extent of being 
invested from other affiliates and the tax burden shown in Table 7, which is a key variable in verification of 
Hypothesis 2, indicate negative values significant at the 5% level in Panels B and D. Table 8 shows the results of the 
analysis using NRM_INDEGREE, which is INDEGREE standardized to consider differences in shareholding 
structures between groups. The coefficients ( 2) of the interaction variables (ETR*INDEGREE) of the tax burden 
and the extent of shareholdings invested are positive and significant at the 5% level in Panels A and C. Since the 
results presented in Tables 7 and 8 support H2, we see that receiving income shifting is more common in firms in 
which more shares are purchased by affiliates within the business group. 
 
Table 7: Results of Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Panel A: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 1 and Indegree 
                   2                                                      
    roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.04511 0.04094 -1.10 -0.04335 0.04102 -1.06 
ETR1 0.17770 0.01565 11.35*** 0.15903 0.03051 5.21*** 
ETR1*INDEGREE    0.00031 0.00044 0.71 
INDEGREE 0.00006 0.00008 0.68 0.00003 0.00009 0.27 
LARGEST 0.07904 0.02000 3.95*** 0.07907 0.02000 3.95*** 
SIZE -0.00109 0.00145 -0.75 -0.00109 0.00145 -0.75 
LEVERAGE -0.11435 0.00969 -11.81*** -0.11426 0.00969 -11.79*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.37 
(<.0001) 
  
13.21 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2283   0.2284   
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Table 7 cont. 
Panel B: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate Dummy 1 and Indegree 
                        2                                                
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.05196 0.03918 -1.33 -0.04517 0.03929 -1.15 
ABOVEETR1 0.10652 0.00485 21.95*** 0.08977 0.00935 9.60*** 
ABOVEETR1*INDEGREE    0.00029 0.00014 2.09** 
INDEGREE 0.00004 0.00008 0.49 -0.00010 0.00010 -0.97 
LARGEST 0.06502 0.01915 3.40*** 0.06556 0.01914 3.42*** 
SIZE -0.00308 0.00139 -2.22** -0.00309 0.00139 -2.23** 
LEVERAGE -0.08546 0.00939 -9.10*** -0.08542 0.00939 -9.10*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
18.76 
(<.0001) 
  
18.60 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2934   0.2942   
Panel C: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 2 and Indegree 
                2  2    2                                                  
    roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.03897 0.04103 -0.95 -0.03582 0.04110 -0.87 
ETR2 0.10583 0.01006 10.52*** 0.08415 0.01908 4.41 
ETR2*INDEGREE    0.00038 0.00028 1.34 
INDEGREE 0.00009 0.00008 1.06 0.00002 0.00010 0.24 
LARGEST 0.07682 0.02006 3.83*** 0.07809 0.02008 3.89 
SIZE -0.00151 0.00145 -1.04 -0.00151 0.00145 -1.04 
LEVERAGE -0.11069 0.00974 -11.36*** -0.11007 0.00975 -11.29 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.09 
(<.0001) 
  
12.96 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2247   0.2250   
Panel D: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate Dummy 2 and Indegree 
                     2   2         2                                       
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
Intercept -0.04917 0.04048 -1.21 -0.04159 0.04053 -1.03 
ABOVEETR2 0.07490 0.00508 14.73*** 0.05198 0.00964 5.39*** 
ABOVEETR2*INDEGREE    0.00040 0.00014 2.80** 
INDEGREE 0.00009 0.00008 1.10 -0.00011 0.00011 -1.02 
LARGEST 0.07069 0.01979 3.57*** 0.07180 0.01978 3.63*** 
SIZE -0.00245 0.00144 -1.71* -0.00241 0.00144 -1.68* 
LEVERAGE -0.10751 0.00960 -11.20*** -0.10606 0.00961 -11.04*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
14.72 
(<.0001) 
  
14.66 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2457   0.2473   
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Table 8: Results of Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Panel A: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 1 and Nrm_Indegree 
                   2       rm              rm                          
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.02838 0.03751 -0.76 -0.02918 0.03749 -0.78 
ETR1 0.17789 0.01565 11.37*** 0.15739 0.01816 8.66*** 
ETR1* 
             
   0.00890 0.00401 2.22** 
             -0.00030 0.00057 -0.52 -0.00117 0.00069 -1.69* 
LARGEST 0.07739 0.01977 3.92*** 0.07725 0.01975 3.91*** 
SIZE -0.00163 0.00134 -1.22 -0.00157 0.00134 -1.17 
LEVERAGE -0.11339 0.00959 -11.82*** -0.11277 0.00959 -11.76*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.37 
(<.0001) 
  
13.28 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2283   0.2293   
Panel B: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate Dummy 1 and Nrm_INDEGREE 
                        2            rm              rm                   
                      roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.03688 0.03589 -1.03 -0.03683 0.03589 -1.03 
ABOVEETR1 0.10661 0.00485 21.97*** 0.10580 0.00537 19.71 
ABOVEETR1* 
             
   0.00030 0.00085 0.36 
             -0.00046 0.00055 -0.84 -0.00062 0.00071 -0.87 
LARGEST 0.06435 0.01892 3.40*** 0.06441 0.01893 3.40*** 
SIZE -0.00356 0.00129 -2.77** -0.00356 0.00129 -2.76** 
LEVERAGE -0.08474 0.00930 -9.11*** -0.08467 0.00930 -9.10*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
18.76 
(<.0001) 
  
18.54 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2934   0.2935   
Panel C: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate 2 and              
                2   2    2   rm              rm                          
               roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.01554 0.03759 -0.41 -0.01705 0.03758 -0.45 
ETR2 0.10564 0.01006 10.50*** 0.08933 0.01233 7.25 
ETR2*
 rm          
   0.00724 0.00316 2.29** 
 rm          -0.00027 0.00057 -0.47 -0.00147 0.00077 -1.89* 
LARGEST 0.07391 0.01983 3.73*** 0.07546 0.01983 3.81*** 
SIZE -0.00226 0.00135 -1.68* -0.00217 0.00135 -1.61 
LEVERAGE -0.10924 0.00965 -11.32*** -0.10829 0.00966 -11.21*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
13.08 
(<.0001) 
  
13.00 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2245   0.2256   
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Table 8 cont. 
Panel D: Regression Results Using the Effective Tax Rate Dummy 2 and Nrm_INDEGREE 
                     2  2         2   rm              rm                   
                      roup dumm     ndustr  dumm     ear dumm    
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Intercept -0.02620 0.03708 -0.71 -0.02637 0.03709 -0.71 
ABOVEETR2 0.07481 0.00508 14.71*** 0.07345 0.00563 13.06*** 
ABOVEETR2* 
NRM_INDEGREE 
   0.00050 0.00089 0.56 
NRM_INDEGREE -0.00021 0.00056 -0.37 -0.00049 0.00075 -0.65 
LARGEST 0.06761 0.01957 3.45*** 0.06769 0.01957 3.46*** 
SIZE -0.00319 0.00133 -2.39** -0.00317 0.00133 -2.38** 
LEVERAGE -0.10604 0.00951 -11.15*** -0.10584 0.00952 -11.12*** 
Group dummy Include   Include   
Industry dummy Include   Include   
Year dummy Include   Include   
N 3788   3788   
F-value for the model 
(p-value) 
14.70 
(<.0001) 
  
14.52 
(<.0001) 
  
R2 0.2455   0.2455   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we examined how income shifting performs among affiliates in a business group to maximize 
the benefits of the entire business group in terms of minimizing the tax burden, with a particular focus on the 
direction of income shifting between affiliates within the business group. The results of the analysis demonstrated 
that performing income shifting occurs frequently in firms that invest more shares in other affiliates within the 
business group. That is, giving income shifting is common among affiliates with high outdegree centrality. Firms 
that are invested from affiliates within their business group tend to be recipients of income shifting. That is, income 
is shifted to affiliates with high indegree centrality. Thus, the ownership structure, which represents the relationships 
between affiliates, affects the decision-making of the controlling shareholders about income shifting for the purpose 
of maximizing the benefits of the entire business group. 
 
The contribution of this study is as follows. First, previous studies revealed the private interests of the 
controlling shareholders as a decisive factor in the direction of income shifting through internal transactions. In this 
study, we examined how the relationships among affiliated firms affect income shifting after controlling for the 
private interests of the controlling shareholders. In addition, we use centrality variables of social network analysis 
techniques to analyze the ownership structure of Korean conglomerates. The limitation of this study is that the 
variables such as OUTDEGREE and INDEGREE is just the direct equity rates, apart from the indirect equity rates. 
While the direct share ratio between affiliated firms may have a direct influence on decision-making for each 
affiliate, since Korean business groups have formed pyramidal ownership structure, and cross-shareholdings 
ownership, indirect control rights through other affiliated firms in complicated ownership structures would be 
considered. 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Kyung Jin Park, Ph.D., Myongji University, Department of Business Administration, 50-3 Namgajadong, 
Seodaemungu, Seoul, 120-728, Korea. E-mail: chichikj@mju.ac.kr 
 
Joohyun Lim, Yonsei University, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Business Administration, 134 Shinchon-dong, 
Seodaemoon-gu, Seoul 120-749, Korea. E-mail: joohyun_lim@yonsei.ac.kr (Corresponding author) 
 
Ki Young Kim, Ph.D., Myongji University, Department of Business Administration, 50-3 Namgajadong, 
Seodaemungu, Seoul, 120-728, Korea. E-mail: kykim@mju.ac.kr 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2014 Volume 30, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 831 The Clute Institute 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., & Mullainathan, S. (2002). Ferreting out tunneling: An application to Indian 
business groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 121-148. 
2. Cheung, Y.-L., Raghavendra Rau, P., & Stouraitis, A. (2006). Tunneling, propping and expropriation: 
evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics, 82(2), 343-
386. 
3. Collins J. H., & Shackelford, D. A. (1998). Global organization and taxes: An analysis of the dividend, 
interest, royalty, and management fee payments between U.S. multinationals' foreign affiliates. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 24(2), 151-173. 
4. Harris, D. G, Morck, R., Slemrod, J., & Yeung, B. (1993). Income shifting in U. S. multinational 
corporations. Studies in International Taxation. 
5. Jacob, J. (1996). Taxes and transfer pricing: Income shifting and the volume of intrafirm transfers. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 34(Autumn), 301-312. 
6. Friedman, E., Johnson, S., & Mitton, T. (2003). Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 31(4), 732-750. 
7. Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). Tunneling. American Economic 
Review, 90, 22-27. 
8. Gordon, E. A., Henry, E., & Palia, D. (2004). Related party transactions and corporate governance and firm 
value. Advances in Financial Economics, 9(b), 1-27. 
9. Grubert, H., & Mutti, J. (1991). Taxes, tariffs, and transfer pricing in multinational corporate decision 
making. The Review of Economics and Statistics, May. 
10. Klassen, K, Lang, M., & Wolfson, M. (1993). Geographic income shifting by multinational corporations in 
response to tax rate changes. Journal of Accounting Research, 31,140-173. 
11. Ko, J. K. (2000). Transfer pricing and tax minimization: Income shifting by Korea multinational companies. 
Korean Accounting Review, 25(2), 51-77. 
12. Kooyul, J., Kim, B., & Kim, B. (2009). Tax motivatied income shifting and Korean Business Group 
(Chaebol). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 36(5 & 6), 552-586. 
13. Mills, L., & Newberry, K. (2004). Do worldwide tax incentives affect the income reporting and debt 
14. policy of foreign-controlled U.S. corporations? National Tax Journal, 57, 89-107. 
15. Rego, S. O. (1999). Multinational income shifting and the endogenous relationship between firm 
profitability and effective tax rates. (Working Paper). University of Iowa. 
16. Rho, J. H. (1997). Tax incentives for income shifting through transfer pricing. Korean Accounting Review, 
22(4), 221-251. 
17. Riyanto, Y. E., & Toolsema, L. A. (2008). Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(10), 2178-2187. 
18. Choi, C.-G. (2009). An analysis of the equity holding structures of Korean Business Groups. Korea 
Economic Research Institute. 
19. Park, J. K., & Kim, H. (2007). Income shifting of conglomerates and tax burden. Journal of Business 
Research, 22(1), 175-201. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2014 Volume 30, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 832 The Clute Institute 
APPENDIX 1 
 
A. The business group is defined as follows in the Law of Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade. The business 
group is a group of firms that the identical person or corporation controls the contents of the business in 
actual. The range of the business group, that is, whether it is an affiliated firm or not is judged with the 
criteria of control power or equity rates. Summary of the criteria for judging the affiliated firms is as 
follows: 
a. Terms of Equity Rates: The firm of which the same party or the party related to the same party 
possesses more than 30% and is the biggest shareholder. 
b. Terms of Control Power (Influence): 
 The same can appoint more than 50/100 of officials 
 The same party exercises the predominant influence on major decision makings or enforcement, 
such as organization shift and new business investment of the related firm. 
 The same party serving as an official in the controlling company and the related company in the 
additional post and interchange of Personnel. 
 By exceeding the common rage, the company considered as an economic identity with the same 
party and the party related to the same party on the common sense, such as finance, assets, goods, 
services transaction, debt assurance, warrant and indicating activities on business that can be 
admitted as its affiliated firm. 
B. The party related to controlling shareholder (the same party) on Law of Monopoly Regulations and Fair 
Trade is shown as following: 
a. Spouse, cognates within second cousin, and relatives within first cousin. 
b. Non-profit corporation or organization that the same party or the party related to the same party 
exercises a predominant influence on the composition of its official or business operation, or Non-
profit corporation or organization with the unique founder or that the same party or the party related to 
the same party becomes the biggest shareholder by totaling the same party or the party related to the 
same party. 
c. Affiliated Firms 
d. The same party of the employee of non-profit corporation, organization, and affiliated firms that are 
under the same part ’s control. 
